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Contemporary Law Developments Under
Conservative Rule: The United States
And Great Britain Compared
PETER E. MILLSPAUGH*
TONY JOHNSON**

The 1980's find Great Britain and the United States turning to
politically conservative leadership. A conservative vision of the future
and the encroaching realities of global economies have combined to
place the industrial relations systems in both countries under stress.
Change has been inevitable. This change is manifest in the contemporary labor law reforms taking place on both sides of the Atlantic
Ocean.
To explore these developments, this article will first sketch the
evolution and traditions of labor law in both Great Britain and the
United States. The specific developments in the labor law of each
country since 1980 will then be outlined and discussed. In the final
section, these contemporary initiatives will be contrasted and compared to each other in light of the traditions and present day industrial relations climate.
I.

TRADE UNION LAW TRADITION IN THE UNITED STATES AND
GREAT BRITAIN

The evolution of English trade union law and, indeed, labor relations law as a whole, contains one important distinguishing feature.'
In contrast to most other western nations, the industrial revolution
swept over England very early in its modern history. Its impact was
felt before democratic rights had been extended to the working
* Professor of Business Legal Studies, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia.
B.S., 1958, United States Military Academy at West Point; M.A., 1962, Georgetown University; J.D., 1968, American University. Admitted to practice, Commonwealth of Virginia.
** Associate Professor, Plymouth Politechnic, Devon, United Kingdom. M.A., 1950,
Cambridge University; LL.M., 1956, Liverpool University.
I. The development of British labor law has been interpreted and chronicled by numerous scholars over the years. Representative of the more current literature would be 0. KAHNFREUND, LABOUR AND THE LAW, A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1977); H. PELLING, A HISTORY
OF BRITISH TRADE UNIONISM (1976); Lewis, The Historical Development of Labor Law, 14
BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 1 (1976).
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classes, and at a time when a strong reaction to the excesses of the
French Revolution remained infused in England's national psyche.
The first legal response to trade unionism in England was
marked by penal legislation. Enactments such as the Combination of
Workmen Acts of 17992 and 18003 provided the trade union movement, like the early church movements, with its founding saints who
suffered an array of ignominies for the cause of trade unionism. 4 The
early part of the 19th century, however, saw the gradual repeal of
such legislation. By 1867, virtually all the criminal restraints on the

activities of trade unions as collective labor organizations had
5
disappeared.
English judicial interpretation of the common law in the context
of industrial disputes seriously undermined the early trade union
movement. For example, early court decisions resulted in the theory
that trade unions operated in restraint of trade because they interfered
with the freedom of "master and servant" to bargain over labor. 6 In

this same period the torts of conspiracy7 and inducement of breach of
contract were also widely used against the unions.8 The controversial
holding of the now infamous case of Taff Vale Railway Co. v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants in 19019, combined with the

mounting frustration of the trade union movement leadership, provided the impetus for the creation of the British Labour Party. Judi-

cial hostility toward the unions reflected in Taff Vale helped to
2. 39 Geo. 3, ch. 12 (1799).
3. 39 & 40 Geo. 3, ch. 106 (1800).
4. By illustration, the Tolpuddle Martyrs are still celebrated by an annual festival in the
English labor world. Tolpuddle is a country village on the banks of the river Puddle Dorsetshire where, in the early 1800s, a number of farm laborers attempted to start an Agricultural
Worker's Union. In 1834, six of the organizers were arrested, convicted, and transported to
Australia under provisions of the Unlawful Oaths Act of 1797. H. PELLING, supra note 1, at
20-22.
5. The last penal provision relating to aggravated misconduct was repealed by the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict., ch. 86. See generally B. COOPER
& A. BARTLETT, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS - A STUDY IN CONFLICT (1976).
6. See Hornby v. Close [1867] 2 L.R.-Q.B. 153. The same courts did not hold that a
consortium of employers to fix prices and the wage rates for employees of various categories
was in restraint of this freedom to bargain. See Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor Gow & Co.,
[18921 App. Cas. 25.
7. See Rex v. Bunn, (1872) 12 Cox C.C. 316; Quinn v. Leatham, [1905] App. Cas. 495.
8. See South Wales Miners' Fed'n v. Glamorgan Coal Co., [1905] App. Cas. 239.
9. Taff Vale Ry. Co. v. Amalgamted Soc'y of Ry. Servants, [19011 App. Cas. 426. Following a strike of railway workers in South Wales to secure improved pay, the rail company
sued the union for the loss of business sustained during the strike. To the surprise of most
legal commentators, the House of Lords held that such a claim could succeed, since at that
time unions did not enjoy incorporated status. Id. at 430-31.
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convince a number of influential trade union leaders that direct political participation would be necessary to achieve their aims.' 0
Although the industrial revolution in America lagged behind
Britain by a period of some five decades, the forerunners of American
labor unions began to appear early in the 1900's in the form of small
craft and art guilds. I I With no national legislation of consequence
affecting labor organization until well into the 20th century, early
American labor law was, like Britain, based on judicial interpretation
of common law precepts. 1 2 Courts in America initially viewed collective action, the backbone of the labor movement, as criminal in nature. Up until 1880, such union activity in the United States was still
being prosecuted under a criminal conspiracy theory.13 Subsequently,
it became more to management's benefit to seek a court injunction of
such activity since it not only restrained workers from union activity,
but kept them out of jail and available to resume work. Based on the
common law interpretation that certain forms of union activity constituted a restraint of trade, management was allowed to practice labor relations law by injunction in the United States until 1932.14
As between the two nations, Britain was first to attempt broad
legislation in the field of labor relations. 15 Under the auspices of a
liberal government, the comprehensive Trades Disputes Act was added to British law in 1906.16 The fundamental thrust of this legislation was to remove the field of industrial disputes from the ambit of
10.
11.

See 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 1, at 69.
For representative historical accounts of the American labor movement, see W.

WALLING, AMERICAN LABOR AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1926); T. BROOKS, TOIL AND

TROUBLE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LABOR (1971); J. RAYBACK, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
LABOR (1966); P. TAFT, ORGANIZED LABOR IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1964).-

12.

For a general treatment of the evolution of American labor law, see B. TAYLOR & F.

WHITNEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW (1983); H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PRO-

CESS (1968); W. BOULD, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW (1982).

13. As the court explained in an early Philadelphia Cordwinders case: "A combination of
workmen to raise their wages may be considered in a two fold point of view: one to benefit
themselves [and] the other is to injure those who do not join their society. The rule of law
condemns both." 3 COMMONS & GILMORE, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 63 (1910).
14. See generally F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREEN, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930);
Petro, Injunctions and Labor Disputes: 1800-1932, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341 (1978).
15. Kahn-Freund contends that the Trade Disputes Act of 1906 marked the first "vitally
important occasion when Parliament had to intervene to redress the balance which had been
upset by court decisions capable of exercising the most injurious influence on the relations
between capital and labour." HAMLYN LECTURE (1971).

16.

6 Edw. 7, ch. 47 (1906).
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the courts and their prevailing common law interpretations.' 7 The
technique employed was not to override common law principles, but
rather to extend a selective immunity from their application to trade
unions.' 8 Specifically, the 1906 Act extended complete immunity to
unions with respect to actions in tort relating to industrial conflict,
but not to their officers or members. However, the Act provided officers and members of a union immunity from the torts of conspiracy
and inducement of breach of contract only if they were acting in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute.' 9 The result was that
actions taken in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute were
no longer actionable under any tort theory even if such activity
20
should interfere with the legitimate interests of another.
Since the common law process is conducted at the hands of the
judiciary, the courts have repeatedly outflanked the statutory immunity of the 1906 Act over the years. Parliament has had to counter
these judicial forays from time to time in order to preserve the intent
of the original statute. 2 1 The unstabilizing effect that this give-andtake process exerts on British industrial relations has become its distinct signature. The trade unions continue to oppose proposals for
alternate forms of legal protection such as a positive "code of rights"
17. It is an interesting historical aside that the Trade Secretary in the new Liberal Government at the time was Winston Churchill who was quoted as supporting the legislation
because:
It is a very unseemly thing, and indeed in the House of Commons we must regard it
as such, to have the spectacle we have witnessed these last few years of these workmen's guilds - trade union organizations - being enmeshed, harassed, worried and
checked at every step and at every turn by all kinds of legal decisions, which came
with the utmost surprise to the greatest lawyers in the country. It is not good for
trade unions that they should be so brought into contact with the courts, and it is not
good for the courts.
B. PERRIN, TRADE UNION LAW 311 (1976).
18. 6 Edw. 7, ch. 47, § 1 (1906); see also 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 1, at 232.
19. 6 Edw. 7, ch. 47, § 5 (1906).
20. Id. § 2.
21. In Amalgamated Soc'y of Ry. Servants v. Osborne, [1910] App. Cas. 87, the House of
Lords, contrary to Steele v. South Wales Miners' Fed'n, [1907] 1 K.B. 361, held that the law
did not permit unions to maintain political funds. This restriction had to be corrected by the
Trade Union Act, 1913, 2 & 3 Geo. 5, ch. 30; Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] App. Cas.. In Rookes,
the House of Lords invented the tort of "intimidation," thereby outflanking the 1906 immunities. This loop-hole had to be corrected by the Trade Disputes Act of 1965. The court in
Torquay Hotel Co. v. Cousins, [1969] 1 All E.R. 522, held that a union could induce a breach
of contract, even though no breach of contract resulted due to a "break" clause permitting
suspension of obligations during "war, and riot, trade dispute." Id. at 529. This had to be
corrected in the Trade Union & Labour Relations Act, 1974, ch. 52.
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or similar legislation in favor of the existing formula. 22 Thus, the immunity device adopted in the early 1906 Act has been carried forward
and preserved in the modem consolidation of British statutory labor
law which was undertaken recently in the Trade Union & Labour
Relations Acts (TULRA) of 197423 and 1976.24
Following the British lead, the United States also adopted national industrial labor legislation in the form of the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA). 25 However, the United States' legislation was comparatively more comprehensive. The NLRA guarantees workers the right to unionize, to bargain collectively over wages
and terms and conditions of employment, and to support their organizing and bargaining demands with the use of economic weapons
such as strike actions, boycotts, and picketing.26 Five specified employer "unfair labor practices" are statutorily prohibited, 27 and procedures are established for certifying and decertifying unions for the
28
purpose of worker representation in dealings with management.
Implementation of the Act is entrusted to a National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB), a permanent regulatory agency which serves as the
forum of first impression for representational or unfair labor practice
complaints. Within this statutory framework, a private ordering of
industrial relations was anticipated through the process of bargaining.
In 1947, the NLRA was amended to achieve a more evenhanded
statutory treatment between industry and labor. This legislation, the
22. Evidence of the Trade Union Council to the House of Commons Committee on Employment Law, COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW, 1980, 170, 282.
23. Trade Union & Labour Relations Acts, 1974, ch. 52.
24. Trade Union & Labour Relations Acts (Amendments), 1976, ch. 7.
25. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976)). As a prelude to the National Labor Relations Act,
Congress had passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act three years earlier, forbidding federal courts
from enjoining certain union activities, such as non-violent picketing and striking. NorrisLaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115
(1976)).
26. See National Labor Relations Act, § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976), which declares that
workers "have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."
27. These unfair labor practices are set out in the National Labor Relations Act, § 8(a),
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976), and include in abbreviated form:
1. Interference with the rights guaranteed in § 7;
2. Interference with the formation of unions;
3. Discrimination against employees who belong to unions;
4. Discrimination against employees seeking relief under the Act; and
5. Refusal to bargain collectively with union representatives.
28. National Labor Relations Act, § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976).
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Labor Management Relations Act 29 (LMRA), provided some of the
new balance by creating certain employer rights by enumerating a list
of prohibited employee unfair labor practices analagous to those assigned to the employer under the NLRA. 30 Among its other provisions, the amendment also prohibited the "closed shop,"' 31 granted the
32
federal courts power to enforce collective bargaining agreements,
and created the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service for labor
disputes capable of causing a national emergency. 33
The third major amendment of American labor statutes, the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, was enacted in
1959.34 This legislation, aimed at problems of union autocracy and
corruption, instituted a series of controls for regulating the internal
affairs of unions. 35 It also further restricted union picketing under
specific circumstances 36 and narrowed the loopholes existing in the
37
statutory prohibition against secondary boycotts.

A retrospective examination of some of the labor law traditions
in the United States and Great Britain reveals that collective activity
by worker organizations was initially unacceptable as a matter of public policy. The common law provided the courts with little precedent
to weigh and balance the merits of organized labor. 38 This, along
with the prevailing perception that labor was primarily a commodity
of commerce, caused members of the labor movement to face criminal
and civil sanctions at the hands of the courts throughout its early
period in both countries. Statutory intervention protecting organized
labor occurred first in Britain at the turn of the century. It immunized most trade union activity from adverse application of common
law concepts by the courts. However, the new legislation did not repeal common law doctrine generally, nor did it directly bestow upon
the unions new positive statutory rights and benefits. Its intent was
29. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1976)).
30. Id. § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976).
31. Id. § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).

32. Id. § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
33. Id. § 202, 29 U.S.C. § 170 (1976).
34. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosures Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (1976)).
35. Id. at tits. I-VI.
36. National Labor Relations Act, § 8(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(7) (1976).
37. Id. § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
38. 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 1.
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merely to provide maneuvering room for trade union activity. 39
As in Great Britain, the labor movement in the United States
initially required protection from the courts and their common law
interpretations. Although this step was essentially accomplished by
the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932, 40 more legislation followed
shortly. Under the NLRA, some three years later the country's preference for comprehensive legislation appeared. The American choice
was to create a statutory framework which imposed a collective-bargaining process at certain points in the existing system, assigned positive statutory rights and duties to the principals, and instituted
procedures to continually monitor various aspects of the industry-labor relationship. It is against this background that the contemporary
developments in labor law and policy in the two countries over the
last five years can be examined.
II.

UNITED KINGDOM DEVELOPMENTS:
LEGISLATIVE REFORM

PHASED

The United Kingdom elected a conservative government in
spring of 1979. The new government promptly introduced the first of
its proposals for labor law reforms into Parliament which responded
by enacting the Employment Act of 1980.41 In framing the Act, the
government indicated an intent to proceed with labor reform in
42
stages, and that this measure was but the first step in that process.
A.

Employment Act of 1980

The 1980 Act is an amending enactment and operates by altering
some of the basic provisions contained in TULRA 1974/76. The two
main areas the government targeted in the 1980 Act were secondary
picketing and closed-shop dismissals. In the course of maneuvering
the bill through Parliament, however, a third area was included, that
of secondary action.
39.

Id.; see also The Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict., ch.

86.
40. Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1976)).
41. Employment Act, 1980, ch. 49.
42. The Conservative Government's general strategy toward the trade unions has been
widely discussed. See, e.g., Gregory, Industrial Relations, the Law and Government Strategy,
56 POL. Q. 23 (Jan./Mar. 1985); Ball, Taming Britain'sUnions, 109 FORTUNE, Apr. 16, 1984,

at 134.
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Under the TULRA 1974/76, 4 3 legal immunity was extended to
picketing in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute. During
the bitter miner's strike which ultimately brought down the Heath
government in 1974, extensive use had been made of the 'flying
picket'. 4 This experience was largely responsible for prompting the
insertion of a provision in the 1980 Act to the effect that, henceforth,
picketing would be entitled to TULRA immunity only if carried out
at or near the picketers' own place of work. 45 Under the mechanics of
this provision, picketing at a secondary location is not rendered illegal, it is merely made susceptible to civil actions at common law by
the employer.46
The 1980 Act also targeted the TULRA provisions recognizing a
trade union closed shop47 and the TULRA statutory presumption
that a dismissal on the base of failure to join a union was fair and
appropriate. 48 To counter the effects of these provisions, the 1980
Act: (1) extended the grounds upon which an employee can refuse to
join a union from solely "religious conviction" to "any deeply-held
personal conviction;" (2) provided that an employee hired prior to a
closed-shop agreement need not join the union; and (3) introduced a
closed-shop employee right to claim unreasonable refusal or exclusion
from union membership. 49 Also inserted was the requirement that
43. Trade Union & Labour Relations Act, 1974, ch. 13, as amended by Trade Union &
Labour Relations Act, 1976, ch. 7, § 3(2); see also Employment Act, 1980, ch. 42.
44. Employment Act, 1980, ch. 42, § 16.
45. Id.
46. Mersey Docks & Harbour Co. v. Verrinder [1982] I.R.L.R. 152. Picketing can also
lead to criminal prosecution under some circumstances. The courts have authorized extensive
police powers to prevent obstruction and/or to prevent a breach or anticipated breach of the
peace as it relates to picketing. See Broome v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1974] App.
Cas. 587, (pickets may not flag down lorries to stop them), Tynan v. Balmer [1967] 1 Q.B. 91,
(walking pickets still an obstruction), Piddington v. Bates [1961] 3 All E.R. 660, (police can
limit number of pickets to as few as two).
47. Trade Union & Labour Relations Act, 1974, ch. 13, § 30. The advantages to a union
of the closed-shop are obvious, but it is interesting to note that many British employers also see
the closed-shop as advantageous, particularly in easing and giving certainty to wage and other
employment negotiations. See Evidence of the Trade Union Council to the COMMIT-FEE ON
EMPLOYMENT LAW,

supra note 22.

48. The provisions relating to unfair dismissal were first enacted in the Industrial Relations Act, 1971, re-enacted in the first schedule to Trade Union & Labor Relations Act, 1974,
ch. 52, amended by the Employment Protection Act, 1975, ch. 71 and are now contained in
the Employment Protection (Consolidated) Act, 1978, pt. v.
49. The common law courts refused to recognize this right. As one court responded,
"What right of property, or what existing right of any sort, one must ask, is a person who is
not a member of a trade union deprived of by not being permitted to join such a union?"
Tierney v. Amalgamated Soc'y of Woodworkers, (1959) I.L.R. The 1980 Act provision also
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subsequent closed-shop arrangements be supported by 80% of the
workers effected, as measured by secret ballot. 50 As a final protection,
the Act conferred joinder powers on employers who could show they
were coerced into closed-shop actions by the union. 51
The 1980 Act also focused on the scope of secondary action immunity. This came in light of a recent holding by the House of
Lords. 52 As noted previously, the immunity of 1906 carried forward
now as set out in TULRA, extended to any activities performed "in
contemplation of furtherance of a trade dispute. ' 53 In a series of recent cases, however, the Court of Appeal had ruled that it was for the
judge to determine on a case-by-case basis how far it was reasonable
for a union to go in seeking immunity in an industrial dispute.54 In
1980 the House of Lords extended immunity to those situations where
"the person instigating the course of action honestly and reasonably
believe that it may further the trade dispute." 5 5 If this criteria can be
established, then the course of action is held to be in furtherance of
that trade dispute, and therefore falls within the immunity of
TULRA. To narrow this judicial expansion of the scope of immunity
in this area, the 1980 Act sanctioned only secondary action against
the "first or immediate supplier" and/or the "first or immediate
customer."

56

B.
The 1982 Act

57

Employment Act of 1982
introduced a number of changes but, like its

brings in the requirement for a tribunal to decide questions of unreasonable refusal or exclusion. Employment Act, 1980, ch. 42, § 4.
50. Note that this does not make a closed-shop without a ballot illegal, but merely means
that if any employee is dismissed, or in any way harrassed because he or she will not join the
union, or resigns from the union, then such action will entitle the employee to compensation
for unfair dismissal.
51. Employment Act, 1980, ch. 42, § 10. Employee compensation in these instances may
be charged wholly against the union or apportioned partly on the employer and partly on the
union, as the facts of the case justify. A number of minor provisions also address the unenforceability of "union-only-labour" clauses in contracts, restrict coercive recruitment tactics,
and limit personal employment rights in small business situations. Id.
52. Express Newspapers v. McShane, [1979] I.C.R. 210. In the course of a dispute with a
regional newspaper group, the National Union of Journalists called on its members nationwide
to support the strike. Id. at 212.
53. Trade Union & Labour Relations Act, 1974, ch. 52, § 7.
54. Beaverbrook Newspapers v. Keys, [1978] I.C.R. 592; Associated Newspapers Group
v. Wade, [1979] 1 W.L.R. 697; Duport Steels v. Sirs, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 697.
55. Express Newspapers v. McShane, [1979] I.C.R. at 212.
56. Employment Act, 1980, ch. 49, § 18.
57. Employment Act, 1982, ch. 46.
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predecessor of 1980, introduced no new formulation of immunity. It
pursued its objectives by continuing the adjustments to the existing
immunity formulation utilized in TULRA. The principal concerns
of the 1982 Act were confined to two subject areas: the definition of a
"trade dispute," and the civil liability of unions themselves, as distinct
from that of their officers and members.
In an attempt to narrow the definition of "trade dispute", 58 the
1982 Act requires that any such dispute "relate wholly or mainly" to
matters pertaining to employment rather than merely being connected
with them. 59 British tradition has afforded industrial strikes or negotiation processes the status of "trade dispute" and therefore legal protection. However, this is not the case where such activity is politically
motivated. As a result of several recent court decisions, the Thatcher
government felt the need to redefine this distinction.
In the interim, courts seem to be adhering to the intent of the
"trade dispute" definition of the 1982 Act by separating trade union
activities from politics. Courts are interpreting relatively minor political factors as sufficient to take a dispute outside of the TULRA immunity.60 These same 1982 Act provisions also take disputes other
than with the workers' own employer, outside the trade dispute definition. 6 1 Although the intent of this change was to deal with demarcation disputes once highly prevalent in some major industries in
Britain, it seems to impinge on recognition issues and the power of
62
strong unions to act in support of the weak.
As to civil liability, the 1982 Act removes the TULRA immunity
63
which unions as an entity had enjoyed since the Taff Vale decision.
However, this provision can be viewed as largely cosmetic since it had
always been possible to sue either the president or general secretary of
a union. In such cases, however, the union virtually always covered
the costs and expenses of such a suit.
58. Trade Union & Labour Relations Act, 1974, ch. 52, § 29.
59. Employment Act, 1982, ch. 46, § 18.
60. See BBC v. Heam, [1979] I.C.R. 685, (sports telecast to S. Africa); NWL v. Woods,
[1979] 1 W.L.R. 1294, (flags of convenience on merchant ships to avoid agreed pay and conditions for seamen); Hadmor Prods. v. Hamilton, [1982] I.C.R. 690, (television studio subcontracted work out formerly done in the studio).
61. Employment Act, 1982, ch. 44, § 15.
62. This becomes apparent in the likely applicability of this provision in cases such as
Quinn v. Leatham, [1901] App. Cas. 495; Stratford & Son v. Linley, [1965] App. Cas. 269;
Cory Literage v. Transp. & Gen. Workers Union, [1973] I.C.R. 339; Grunwick Processing
Laboratories v. Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Serv., [1978] I.C.R. 231.
63. Employment Act, 1982, ch. 44, §§ 15-18.
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The 1982 Act also touches on the issue of the closed-shop. It
extends the balloting requirements of the 1980 Act to all closed-shop
situations, and requires balloting every five years. In order to have or
maintain a closed-shop, 80% of the employees covered by closedshop, or 85% of those voting must approve it. In addition to lost
compensation," the Act also establishes the right to punitive damages
of up to 20,000 pounds for employees unfairly dismissed for failure to
65
join a union.
C. Trade Union Act of 1984
The Trade Union Act of 1984 broke more new ground in addressing three main areas: (1) members support for strike actions; (2)
ballot requirements concerning union political funds; and (3) the election of union governing bodies. Since a number of its provisions are
still being phased into effect at this writing, its impact cannot be fully
gauged. However, this third phase of the Government's program
could be far reaching.
Under the 1984 Act, 66 any strike action enjoying TULRA immunity must be supported by a majority of those members likely to be
called out on strike. This majority is to be ascertained by "a secret
and properly conducted ballot" held not more than 4 weeks before the
strike begins. 67 The Act requires that the balloting be conducted
either by mail or at the workplace and must be followed by an announcement of the voting figures to the members involved. 68 A ballot
69
result is not valid more than 4 weeks from the time it is taken.
When taken together, the implications of these provisions could significantly reduce the flexibility of union negotating strategy in dealing
°
with industry.7
64. Employment Act, 1982, ch. 44, § 3.
65. Id. Note that compensation cannot be claimed by an employee dismissed because he
will not join a union in a closed-shop situation, provided that all the requirements and embargoes of the 1980 and 1982 Acts have been duly observed and executed. To do this however, is
a tall order. The 1982 Act also contains a miscellany of minor provisions, such as the permitting of selective dismissals in a strike and more restraint on union-labor-only requirements in
tendering and contract procedures.
66. Trade Union & Labour Relations Act, 1984, ch. 49.
67. Id. The ballot must require the voter to indicate "whether he is prepared to take part,
or, as the case may be, to continue to take part in a strike involving him in a breach of his
contract of employment." Trade Union & Labour Relations Act, 1984, ch. 49, § 11(4).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Trade Union & Labour Relations Act, 1984, ch. 49, § 11 extends the entitlement to
vote to "all those members of the trade union who it is reasonable at the time of the ballot for
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The Act also addresses union political funds. Phased into force
in 1986,71 the Act requires any union which has an approved political
fund to hold a secret ballot of all its members at intervals of not more
than 10 years, in order to determine whether that fund shall be maintained. 72 Supplementary provisions mandate that trade union funds
may not be spent on "political objectives" other than out of a fund
authorized for this purpose by ballot. Mirroring the Act's pre-strike
balloting requirements, union members must vote at their workplace,
73
or by mail, "at no cost to themselves.1

The last matter dealt with in the 1984 Act is a requirement that
trade union governing bodies shall be directly elected by a secret ballot of all that union's members. 74 Again, the voting must be at the
75
members' workplace, or by mail and at no cost to the member.
These provisions are designed to override existing rules or provisions
contained in any union constitution. 76 Failure to comply with these
requirements will subject the offending union to civil remedies, including injunction. 77 Alternatively, enforcement of these provisions
can be achieved by application to the Certification Officer 78 for a declaration which is enforceable by court order.
the union to believe will be called upon in the strike or other industrial action in question to act
in breach of ... contract." Id. No other category of person can vote, including those who
may be laid off as a result. It is incumbent upon the union to accurately determine exactly
those who are likely to be called out on strike. If tactics or circumstances bring about a change
in the persons affected, a new ballot may have to be held under these new provisions of the law.
Trade Union & Labour Relations Act, 1984, ch. 49, § 7(2).
71. Trade Union & Labour Relations Act, 1984, ch. 49, § 10(3).
72. Id.
73. Id. One manner in which these provisions, if combined, could impact on trade union
bargaining in industrial negotiations is on the bargaining leverage of a threatened strike action
which in effect terminates four weeks after the authorizing vote, therefore necessitating periodic balloting during extended negotiations.
74. Trade Union & Labour Relations Act, 1984, ch. 49, §§ 12-13. Under the Trade
Union Act, 1913, a union is required to hold a ballot of members before it can set up a political
fund, but the union is not required to repeat the ballot at set intervals. Id.
75. Trade Union & Labour Relations Act, 1984, ch. 49, § 12.
76. This general statutory invasion of trade union autonomoy over political funds can be
anticipated to bring retribution when and if the Labour Party resumes power. On such an
occasion it would seem certain that severe constraints would be placed on companies and
wealthy trust funds regarding their ability to donate to political parties.
77. Trade Union & Labour Relations Act, 1984, ch. 49, § 4.
78. Trade Union & Labour Relations Act, 1984, ch. 49, § 5. The Certification Officer is
an independent statutory officer appointed under the Employment Protection Act of 1975. He
is the successor to the Registrar of Trade Unions who first appeared in 1875. His main duties
relate to the keeping of a registrar of duly constituted unions and employer's associations, and
monitoring their annual reports and accounts.
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As a supplementary requirement, the 1984 Act mandates that
British trade unions compile and keep current a register of their members' names and addresses. 79 This will impose a particularly heavy
burden on those unions which inherently experience a large turnover
80
in their membership.

III.

UNITED STATES DEVELOPMENTS:
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

The conservative Administration in the United States since 1980
has shown little interest in formal statutory labor reform and it has
not been a prominent political issue. However, significant labor law
change has been introduced during this period, through the reinterpretation of a growing number of provisions of the National Labor
Relations Act as amended. The lead in this reinterpretation process
has been taken by a recently secured majority of presidentially appointed members on the National Labor Relations Board. 8' The significance of this NLRB reinterpretation cannot be lightly dismissed.
The new Board's decisional initiatives have started fast and will continue. Furthermore, they have generally been well received by the
82
courts on appeal.
A.

National Labor Relations Board Activism

The reaction in organized labor circles to some of the new
Board's decisions has been heated. 83 As a result, labor allies in Congress conducted hearings on the conduct of the NLRB in June of
1984. The Democratic majority on the investigating committee subsequently issued a report which decried "the failure of American la79. Trade Union & Labour Relations Act, 1984, ch. 49, § 4.
80. For example, the Union of Shop, Distributive & Allied Workers calculates that it has
over 100,000 new members every year, with over 300 members joining and leaving every day.
3 TRADE UNION L. BULL. 79-80 (1984).
81. The NLRB is comprised of five members, appointed by the President on confirmation
by the Senate for 5 year staggered terms. The President has the authority to designate one
member as Chairman. The Board's General Counsel who supervises the operations of the
Board, is also appointed by the President upon Senate confirmation for a 4 year term.
82. See D. Dotson & C. Williamson, infra note 87, at 3-7. Under NLRB procedure,
complaints first considered by an NLRB administrative law judge can be taken to the NLRB
en banc for de novo consideration. Board decisions can be appealed to the federal appellate
courts.

83. At one point, the President of the AFL-CIO suggested that Congress repeal the nation's labor laws so that business and labor could battle it out "mano a mano." Kirkland'sCall
to Void Labor Laws Ignited a Growing National Debate, Wall St. J.,Nov. 7, 1984, at 3 1, col. 5.
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bor law" as administered under the new Board. 84 However, the
report's conclusions that the new Board's decisions were anti-union
and setting new management precedent, ignored much of the testimony of former agency members, labor bar practitioners and legal
scholars. The thrust of the testimony, to the contrary, was essentially
that the decisions in question merely returned the law to previous
lines of established Board precedent.8 5 Board chairman Donald L.
Dotson, 86 the focus of much of the criticism during his initial months
in office, appears to have weathered the cries for his resignation as the
new Board's actions are becoming better understood. 87 A degree of
calm and reason appears to have returned to the controversy at this
writing.
B.

DecisionalReforms

The new Board majority has sought to explain a number of its
actions as responses to federal circuit court criticisms of the resultoriented tendency of previous Board decisions. 88 The contention is
that these decisions strayed from principle, applicable precedent, and
evidentiary rules in order to arrive at the desired outcome. As a result, the new Board's decisions commonly identify and adopt a previ89
ously rejected line of Board precedent as support for their rulings.
The major areas of labor policy where the new Board has introduced
some readjustments include the redefinition of concerted activitiy,
bargaining requirements associated with industrial restructuring decisions, employer responses to union organizing activity, and Board deference to the arbitration process.
1. The redefinition of concerted activity.
Section 7 of the NLRA protects the worker's right to act collec84. The Failureof LaborLaw-A BetrayalofAmerican Workers: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Labor, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1984) [hereinafter The Failureof Labor Law].
85. See minority views and testimony of Edward B. Miller, Chairman, NLRB, 1970-74,
John S. Irving, Deputy General Counsel NLRB, 1976-79, and Peter G. Nash, General Counsel, NLRB 1971-75 from The Failureof Labor Law, supra note 90.
86. Mr. Dotson represented Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corporation and served as an Assistant Secretary of Labor before his appointment to the Board.
87. The Chairman and his Chief Counsel have co-authored a rebuttal to criticisms of the
Board concerning the new decisions causing the most controversy. See D. Dotson & C. Williamson, New Directions at the National Labor Relations Board (1984) (unpublished). "The
first task of the Reagan appointees to this Board was to return the Board to principle and
precedent." Id. at 7.
88. Id. at 3-7.
89. See infra notes 95, 102, 108 and accompanying text.
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tively or in concert with one another. 90 In 1975, the Board introduced the notion that even one acting alone could be entitled to
concerted action protection under Section 7 of the NLRA. 9' The
1975 Board ruled that a maintenance employee's safety complaints,
although dismissed by the administrative law judge, constituted protected concerted action, because industrial safety had been made a
subject of both federal and state statutes. Accordingly, "concert of
action can emanate from the individual assertion of such statutory
rights."'92 Therefore, concerted action protection was extended to in93
dividual acts presumed by the Board to be of interest to the group.
The new Board argued that such a decision was effectively reading the word "concerted" out of the statute, and substituting Board
judgment in place of that intended by the clear language of the statute. 94 When concerted action protection was claimed by a worker
who reported allegedly unsafe conditions to the state Public Service
Commission, the new Board used the occasion to overrule Alleluia
and its progeny as to both the statutory meaning of concerted activity
and the burden of proof requirement. 95 For an employee's action to
be concerted, the Board explained, "we shall require that it be engaged in, with or on the authority of other employees, and not soley
by and on behalf of the employee himself."'96 To prove concerted action would once again require evidence of support for the action by
other employees. The previous Board had required evidence that
did in orother employees disavow support for what the complainant
97
concerted.
not
was
activity
the
that
der to establish
The new Board checked the expansionist tendencies of its predecessor with regard to protectable union activity under section 7.98 In
reality, the type of actions the earlier Board was sheltering under its
Alleluia doctrine were already largely protected under numerous regulations designed to encourage socially responsible individual initia90.
91.
92.

National Labor Relations Act, § 7, 29 U.S.C. 157 (1976).
Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975).
Id. at 1004.

93.

Id.

94. Steere Dairy, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1350, 1351 (1978); Ontario Knife Co., 247 N.L.R.B.
1288, 1296 (1980).
95. Meyers Indus., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 495 (1984).
96. Id. at 495-96.
97. Id. at 497.
98. Id. at 496; see also Guideline Memorandum 84-3, Office of General Counsel, National
Labor Relations Board (Feb. 16, 1984).
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tives generally. 99 NLRB protection for such activity needlessly
broadened the jurisdiction of a regulatory agency already struggling
with a backlog of work.
2.

Bargaining and industrial restructuring decisions

The second area the new Board has entered deals with the scope
of the NLRA's mandatory bargaining requirement as it applies to
plant closings and/or work transfers. Here, the new Board has followed the lead of the Supreme Court's holding in FirstNationalMaintenance Corp. v. NLRB. 100 This decision resulted in the most
comprehensive analysis to date of the mandatory bargaining requirement over work terminations under the NLRA 1°1 and required overruling yet another expansive reading of the Act by the previous
Board. 102 In effect, the Supreme Court placed those management decisions which change the scope, nature or direction of the business
outside of mandatory bargaining. At the same time it placed those
management decisions based on labor costs within the bargaining requirement. Those decisions containing elements of both, the Court
noted, require bargaining only "if the benefit for labor management
relations and the collective bargaining process outweighs the burden
10 3
placed on the conduct of the business."'
In holdings since the advent of First National Maintenance, the
new Board has begun to align agency decisions in this area with
Supreme Court dictates.' 0 4 One example is the challenge to the Otis
Elevator Company's decision to consolidate its research and development work at Mahaw, New Jersey with its operations in East Hartford, Connecticut, which came before the Board in the spring of
1984.105 Applying the analysis outlined in First National Mainte-

nance, the Board found that the company's decision was of the sort
that was necessary to the exercise of entrepeneurial control. The deci99. These statutes, referred to as "whistle blower" statutes, employ disincentives and
sanctions to employers who retaliate against employees who undertake socially desirable actions. See Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 510-29, 29 U.S.C. § 1140
(1978); Occupational Safety & Health Act § 11(c), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1978).
100. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
101. National Labor Relations Act, §§ 8(a)(5), 8(d), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 158(d) (1976).
102. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 242 N.L.R.B. 462 (1979).
103. 452 U.S. at 678.
104. For an analysis of the judicial response to various legal theories now being advance to
challenge management plant closing decisions generally, see Millspaugh, Plant Closing and the
Prospectsfor a JudicialResponse, 8 J. CORP. L. 483 (1983).
105. Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984).
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sion involved effecting a "change in the nature and direction of a significant facet of its business," not labor costs. Therefore the Board
concluded that bargaining was not required.106
Earlier in 1984, the new Board reversed another closely related
line of decisions established by its predecessor. This prior line of decision forbade an employer, after bargaining in good faith to impasse
with the union, from relocating work during the term of an existing
labor contract. 0 7 The prior Board found that such a work relocation
constituted an impermissable modification of a collective bargaining
agreement. 108
In a subsequent case some four years later, the Milwaukee Spring
Division of Illinois Coil Spring Company found itself in a similar position.' 0 9 Upon bargaining to impasse for a reduction in wages under
an existing labor contract containing no work preservation clause,
management unilaterally decided to move the unprofitable unit to another location in order to achieve the necessary economies. The
union challenged the decision on the basis that union consent was
required under previous Board precedent. 110 This claim was denied
by the new Board. 11 ' The Board stated that the company had met the
bargaining requirement by bargaining to impasse. ' 2 Further, the
Board stated that the company did not unlawfully modify the existing
labor contract because a relocation (as opposed to a reassignment) did
not breach the terms of the existing pact. The new Board argued that
under the previous rule, frank and truthful midterm bargaining would
be undermined. By the injection of labor costs into the dispute, union
bargaining would be mandated, creating the likelihood of a union veto
over the transfer decision. 113 The new Board's inclination to protect
management prerogatives and flexibility in this area is explained in
part as an effort to facilitate the restructuring presently underway in
many of America's basic industries.
106. Id. at 892.
107. Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co., 235 N.L.R.B. 720, 733 (1978).
108. Cf. The Boeing Co., 230 N.L.R.B. 720 (1977).
109. 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1982) (supplemental decision and order).
110. Id. The new Board actually requested that the Seventh Circuit remand the old
Board's 1982 decision (265 N.L.R.B. 206, which was in favor of the union and had gone up on
appeal), back to the new Board for reconsideration. The Circuit Court consented and the new
Board proceeded to reverse the previous Board's decision. See Millspaugh, Midterm Plant
Relocations: The NLRB Puts Humpty Dumpty Together Again, 35 LABOR L.J. 289 (1984).
111. 268 N.L.R.B. at 602-03.
112. Id. at 603.
113. Id. at 604.
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Employer response to organizing activity

There is mounting evidence that the new Board is interested in
removing a number of the previous Board's presumptions of employer
anti-union motives. The area pertaining to management reaction to
union organizing campaigns seems to be of particular interest. It is
anticipated that relatively minor adjustments of this nature will result
in increased objectivity in Board rulings.
One current example of the new Board's activities in this area is
the treatment of in-plant work rules governing union organizing activity. The previous Board departed from a ten year precedent 1 4 when
it held that employer rules which prohibited union soliciting during
"working time" were presumptively invalid because they applied to
15
the entire work shift, including employee time like lunch periods.
Rules limiting such solicitation had previously been presumed valid
because "working time" was understood to constitute company time,
i.e., time when the employee was expected to be working. In contrast,
rules limiting solicitation to "working hours" were understood to apply to the entire work shift and to include employee time such as the
lunch period, and were presumptively invalid. 1 6 The new Board's
recent decision in Our Way, Inc.,1 1 7 returned the law to the previous
industry distinction between "working hours" and "working time",
and reinstated the presumption of validity for those work rules which
18
prohibit solicitation only during "working time."'
The new Board also has acted to remove anti-union presumptions in the area of management questioning of employees concerning
union organizing activity implicitly recognized by the previous Board.
Prior to the recent line of cases which culminated in the previous
Board's ruling in PPGIndustries,1 9 the NLRB had refused to find an
interference with an employee's Section 8(a)(1) protections in em20
ployer interrogation situations absent the employer's use of threats.
Prior Boards had traditionally utilized the following long-standing
test: whether, under all of the circumstances, the questioning tends to
restrain, coerce, or interfere with an employee's rights guaranteed
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Essex Int'l, 211 N.L.R.B. 749 (1974).
T.R.W. Bearings, 257 N.L.R.B. 442, 444 (1981).
211 N.L.R.B. at 750.
268 N.L.R.B. 394 (1983).
Id. at 394-95.
251 N.L.R.B. 1146 (1980).
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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under the Act. 121 Instead of considering all of the circumstances, the
previous Board in PPGIndustries inserted a per se rule which, in effect, made any questioning, even though addressed to open, active
union supporters, "inherently coercive" and therefore illegal. 122 The
new Board utilized the recent complaint in Rossmore House 123 to reject this line of decision. In doing so, it returned the law to the requirement that the Board analyze all of the factors in each case so
that the realities and practicalities of the workplace can once again be
124
factored into the Board's decisions in this area.
4.

NRLB deference to arbitration

To understand the tendencies of the new Board in defining its
role in relation to labor arbitration, it is necessary to bear in mind that
section 10 of the NLRA requires that Board's power to remedy unfair
labor practices be unaffected by other means of adjustment. 25 Board
deferral to arbitration is discretionary, but the Act clearly states a
preference for methods "agreed upon by the parties ...for settlement
of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of
126
an existing collective bargaining agreement."'
Labor arbitration has become a favored method of dispute resolution in American industrial relations and is generally encouraged by
the courts and the NLRB. Its acceptance in practice is evidenced by
the fact that over ninety percent of existing collective bargaining contracts contain a provision for some form of arbitration.'27 Until recently, the Board had clearly drawn the line between its responsibility
to remedy unfair labor practices and to defer to the arbitration process. As to both collective and individual rights in prearbitral situations, the Board customarily gave deference to an arbitration clause
and became involved only when an arbitrator's decision was clearly at
odds with the Act. 128 In the aftermath of arbitration, the Board also
121. Blue Flash Express, 109 N.L.R.B. 591 (1954).
122. 251 N.L.R.B. at 1147. The previous board stated: "The type of questioning at issue
conveys an employer's displeasure with employee's union activity and thereby discourages
such activity in the future. The coercive impact of these questions is not diminished by the
employee's open union support or by the absence of attendant threats." Id.
123. 269 N.L.R.B. 1176 (1984).
124. Id. at 1177.
125. National Labor Relations Act, § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1976).
126. National Labor Relations Act, § 23(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976).
127. D. Dotson & C. Williamson, supra note 87, at 14.
128. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971); National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B.
527 (1972). For support of pre-arbitral deferral, see Cary v. Westinghouse Corp., 375 U.S. 261
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refused to become involved so long as the arbitration was binding, the
proceedings appeared regular on their face, and the decision was con12 9
sistent with the Act.
The previous Board aborted most of this established prearbital
deference.130 However, in the recent ruling of United Technologies
Corp.,131 the new Board returned to the prior Collyer and National
Radio deferral doctrine. 132 Under this rule, the Board argued, the
statutory purpose of encouraging collective bargaining is better served
by holding the parties to their agreement to arbitrate. By so deferring, the Board is not abdicating its statutory responsibility as its critics claim, since it can always reinsert itself in any instance where the
133
parties have contravened the safeguards outlined in Spielberg.
The previous Board, in Propoco, Inc., also abruptly departed
13 4
from the long established Spielberg test for post-arbitral deferral.
The decision declared that deferral henceforth would be applicable
only where the Board reached a separate, specific determination that
the arbitrator had disposed of the issues just as the Board would have
done. 35 This awkward doctrine would have required the NLRB to
conduct endless de novo determinations of arbitration awards and
would have encouraged disgruntled parties to inevitably appeal to the
Board. However, the new Board recently overturned Propoco.136 The
present standard for post-arbitral deferral now requires that the arbitrator's decision be merely "susceptible to interpretation consistent
with the act."' 137 Further, adequate consideration of any unfair labor
practice charge is satisfied where it can be shown that the facts of the
contract issue parallel those of the unfair labor practice issue, and the
arbitrator has the facts before him relevant to resolving the unfair
38
labor practice. 1
(1964). Deferral was extended to § 8(a)(3) cases in National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527
(1972).
129. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955). The Board also added the requirement that the arbitrator must have considered any unfair labor practice issue. Raytheon
Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 886 (1963).
130. General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977).
131. 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984).
132. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
133. 268 N.L.R.B. at 560.
134. Professional Porter & Window Cleaning Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 136 (1982).
135. Id. at 137-38.
136. 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
137. Id. at 574.
138. Id. The Board also placed the burden of "affirmatively demonstrating the defects in
the arbitral process or award" on the party seeking Board intervention. Id.
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CONTEMPORARY ANGLO-AMERICAN LABOR LAW REFORM:
CONTRAST AND COMPARISON

Contemporary labor reform in the United States and Britain is
more easily understood when analyzed in light of each nation's industrial labor relations history and tradition. The courts' initial rejection
of any societal role for organized labor activity in the economic or
political life in both nations is illustrative. 13 9 A degree of this early
judicial reluctance to structure a common law accommodation for
worker actions in the new industrial setting remains to this day. In
both the United States and Britain, a residual antipathy toward the
goals and practices of organized labor emerges from both the form
and content of current labor law developments.
The manner in which the labor movements in both countries was
eventually able to secure a degree of legitimacy is also important to
the analysis of current developments. Although union recognition
was secured through statutory intervention by the central government
of both countries, the form which that intervention assumed provides
a sharp contrast. In Britain, labor's struggle led to direct participation in national political processes with the formation of the British
Labour Party at the turn of the century. Thereafter, labor issues in
that country have remained on the nation's political agenda and have
been adressed on a national scale.14° This is characterized by its most
recent initiatives. In contrast, the labor movement in the United
States was never able to solidify and attract sufficient support to sustain itself as a major independent political force. Throughout the
evolution of American industrial relations, organized labor has pursued its interests politically through one of the nation's established
political parties. Labor's inability to move its concerns to the national
agenda today is attributable at least in part to this distinctive feature.
The tradition of labor law by legislation is not the only feature
retained by the recent labor law developments in Great Britain. The
continued tug-of-war between the common law courts and Parliament
has also been assured by retention of the legislative immunity device
to secure union protections. The courts should find the recent immunity adjustments of the Conservative government more to their liking,
however, since they generally seek to contract the scope of trade
union immunity.14 These preferences for a legislative initiative and
139. See supra notes 2-14 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 41-80 and accompanying text.
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the retention of the immunity device, are in character with British
labor reform tradition.
The long-standing political impotence of orgnized labor in the
United States, by comparison, has foreclosed the prospects for significant pro-labor federal legislation in recent years. Labor's inability to
secure a modest streamlining of the NLRA's representational
processes and a strengthening of its remedies through a proposed Labor Reform Act in the late 1970's under a Democratic President, is
illustrative. 42 The absence of British-style labor legislation in recent
years in the United States is attributable to more than simply labor's
political weakness. In contrast to British legislative intervention by
the implementation of judicial immunity, American intervention installed permanent industrial relations machinery and procedures. By
design, the law sought to establish an on-going process whereby labor
relations would essentially be self-regulating. 143 The struggle for labor law reform in the United States therefore has been largely defined
by the ability to control and manipulate the industrial relations system from within. Contemporary developments have come in the form
of internal adjustment in the United States largely because legislative
change imposed from outside the established system is the exception
rather than the rule.
Moreover, pushing for national labor reform legislation would be
out of character for a contemporary American administration unless
such reforms were incorporated as part of its political program. In
part, this explains the absence of significant legislative labor reform
initiatives under the present Administration. Nonetheless, substantial
changes comporting to the Administration's conservative vision of industrial relations are presently rooting in American labor law. The
power of appointment is proving to be an effective agent of change as
it influences the content and tenor of contemporary industrial relations laws. In a few short years, the present Administration has already begun to neutralize the persistent labor-oriented perspective
which has dominated NLRB rulings in recent decades.
Concerning the content of the reforms emerging in both nations,
only some tentative observations are possible at this early juncture.
Reforms since 1980 have been piecemeal. More time must elapse
before the full extent and impact of specific changes can be accurately
gauged. It is clear however that the Conservative leadership in Great
142.
143.

See Rosen, Labor Law Reforms: Dead or Alive?, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 1 (1979).
See supra notes 25-37 and accompanying text.
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Britain has succeeded in enacting restrictions on the union practices
of secondary picketing and secondary boycotting, while imposing further limits on the establishment and conduct of union closed shops. 144
Two years later, the government was able to narrow the legal definition of a "trade dispute" through a second phase of labor legislation
which also removed unions, as entities themselves, from TULRA immunity. 145 A third legislative initiative in 1984 instituted far-reaching
union governance requirements, including a secret ballot requirement
among other pre-strike conditions, procedures giving members
greater control over the use of union political funds, and the selection

of union leadership. 146
Beyond their clear pro-industry orientation, the British reforms
appear essentially unrelated and do not reflect a dominant or unifying
theme. While a contracted TULRA immunity is the principal mechanism utilized to curb union activity, the insertion of certain statutory
procedures are aimed at increasing union accountability to its membership with regard to statutorily specified matters.
In light of the mechanism through which current reforms are
being implanted in American labor law over this same period, it
would be unrealistic to expect much coherence. The agent for
change, the NLRB, is largely confined to the issues framed in the
cases presented to it for resolution. It can be anticipated, however,
that the management segment of the labor relations bar will be alert
to opportunities for the present Board to set additional precedent.
In the contemporary American setting, the NLRB has just begun
to exert its influence on American labor law and practice. Already its
interpretations have narrowed the scope of protected "concerted action." 47 In a short span of time, the new Board has also utilized
opportunities to afford management increased entrepreneurial flexibility by protecting its perogatives concerning work transfers and relocations. 148 The new Board has been able to re-institute the presumption
of validity as to employer solicitation bans limited to "working time"
only, and remove the unqualified per se illegality previously associated
with all employee interrogations.149 It appears also that the new
Board has been able to re-establish the previous standard for Board
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes

44-56 and accompanying text.
63-65 and accompanying text.
66-80 and accompanying text.
95-99 and accompanying text.
109-13 and accompanying text.
114-18 and accompanying text.
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deferral to arbitration, restoring this important dispute resolution
mechanism to its traditional place in American labor law
50
jurisprudence.
These early isolated actions obscure specific trends in the law. It
is clear, however, that the administrative nerve center of the United
States industrial relations systems is concerned with the competitiveness of American industry in world markets. Its inclination, for example, is to restrict it's own jurisdiction where it apears that market
forces will circumscribe the behavior of the parties. The Board's new
Chairman himself recently suggested a number of themes expected to
be embodied in the agency's future rulings. 5 1 These include the protection of individual employee rights (as against both unions and corporations), greater Board adherence to Congressional intent, and a
reduction of the federal government's role in collective bargaining and
1
labor contract administration. 52
V.

CONCLUSIONS

Labor law development in the United Kingdom and the United
States have been nurtured by conservative governments since 1980.
The form which these developments have assumed are in character
with the distinct traditions in each country for instituting labor law.
The British have now completed a three-phased legislative program,
while the United States is promulgating change through the decisional
process which controls its industrial relations system.
In both nations the reforms have been hodge-podge in content,
and gradually phasing into effect. The British measures have primarily addressed a seemingly unrelated list of isolated union practices in
an effort to restrict these practices. TULRA immunity has been continued as the principal legislative device for regulating trade union
power in the United Kingdom. Because industrial relations are
largely self-regulating under the American system, labor law reform is
emanating from NLRB adjudication. The content of the reform
therefore is primarily a function of those issues placed before the
Board in the ongoing course of affairs with little opportunity for a
larger coherence in its promulgation.
Neither government is intent on launching a major assault
against the institution of organized labor. There is a degree of accept150.
151.
152.

See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
D. Dotson & C. Williamson, supra note 87, at 10.
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ance of the status quo as to the more general role of unions on the
part of both governments. In Great Britain, however, where labor
relations law has traditionally been the handmaiden of political
dogma, specific, perceived union abuses have been promptly and directly addressed through national legislation. By any reasonable measure, these steps represent incremental, rather than radical, changes in
British labor law.
Closely linked through heritage, custom, and language, Britain
and the United States nevertheless reflect industrial relations experiences which differ distinctly in a number of major respects. These
distinctions largely account for the disparity in form which contemporary labor law developments have taken in the two countries. In perspective, the measures taken under conservative rule this decade
amount to little more than a modest oscillation in the continuum of
labor relations law in both nations. The elimination of many of today's changes will constitute the reforms of tomorrow when the pendulum returns.

